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TAXATION AND PROFESSIONAL
SPORTS-A LOOK INSIDE
THE HUDDLE
WILLIAM H. BAKER*
I. INTRODUCTION
People have been saying for years that sports has become a big busi-
ness. As we move toward the end of the century, that seems to be a gross
understatement. Every aspect of sports involves sums of money that
were unthinkable just a few years ago. Michael Jordan reportedly re-
ceived $30 million for playing for the Chicago Bulls in the 1997-1998
season.' Salaries in baseball also have escalated.2 The cost of acquiring a
franchise has continued to move upward to the point where the Wash-
ington Redskins are expected to sell for over $700 million.3 Ticket prices
paid by spectators have gone so high that only the affluent can now at-
tend the events in person. Some have speculated that the way things are
going, in the not-too-distant future, games may be played in the stark
silence of a studio environment while millions of fans watch on television
screens. The cost of new stadiums has also kept pace with the upward
trend of the other aspects of sports.
Despite all of the big dollar figures that apply to sports, the Govern-
ment has contended in litigation that professional sports franchises were,
in part, hobbies or toys in the hands of rich owners who were enjoying
* Professor of Law, DePaul University College of Law. A.B., Duke University; J.D., Uni-
versity of Maryland.
1. See Frederick C. Klein, On Sports: Basket Case, WALL ST. J., Oct. 30, 1998, at W6.
2. See id. at W6. According to the press, the New York Mets signed Mike Piazza to a $91
million, seven year contract, at the end of 1998. See iL Albert Belle left the Chicago White
Sox to join the Baltimore Orioles for a reported $65 million over 5 years. See Ronald Blum,
Johnson Picks D-Bucks; Baltimore Signs Belle, TULSA WoRD, Dec. 1, 1998, at 4. Baseball
owners have been complaining about escalating salaries, and Commissioner Selig appointed a
panel of three people to investigate the sport's economic system. See Selig to Appoint Panel on
Economic Situation, SAN F,,Ncsco ExAmInER, Jan. 14, 1999, at D3. On the subject of esca-
lating salaries, the Los Angeles Dodgers gave pitcher Kevin Brown a contract providing for
$105 million over seven years. See id. The baseball collective bargaining agreement runs
through the year 2000, but the players' association has the option to extend it for one more
year to 2001. See id.
3. Rupert Murdock paid over $300 million for the Los Angeles Dodgers and is reported
to be offering $1 billion for the Manchester United soccer team. See Andrew Serwer, The
Redskins are Worth How Much?, FORTUNE, Feb. 1, 1999, at 161. The Cleveland Browns were
sold to Baltimore interests for about $530 million. See id.
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the fun of being franchise owners.4 The Government lost that argument
in the Selig case, but if it had won, there could have been an allocation
between the joy value and the business value for tax purposes. The Gov-
ernment would have allocated the joy value to the franchise as a nonde-
preciable asset. The "joy argument" was a very difficult one to make
because the enormous sums involved, the scope of activities engaged in
by professional franchises, and the way the activities are managed, indi-
cate that these activities clearly are businesses. In addition, even if the
activity were one partly engaged in for pleasure, the amount allocated to
the pleasure portion would apply to a portion of all of the activities en-
gaged in and not just the franchise itself. Once that allocation was made,
depreciation could be determined properly on player contracts.
The Court in Selig ruled against the Government on that point and
held that owning a professional sports franchise does constitute a
business. 5
As the dollar amounts have gone up in professional sports, the tax
issues relating to the key aspects of sports have become more significant.
The primary purpose of this article is to focus on the three aspects of
professional sports with respect to which tax considerations play a very
important part-franchises, stadiums, and players' income.
II. FRANCHISES
When a sports franchise is bought, the purchaser receives a number
of different items of property. A small amount of tangible personal prop-
erty (equipment and supplies) is received. The significant part of the ac-
quisition is the intangible assets-player contracts, the right to share in
league television and licensing income, and the franchise itself (the right
to be a team in the league, to play the schedule with the other teams and
participate in the player draft). In some instances, although it is unusual,
a stadium comes along with the deal also.
The question of allocation becomes important because, with respect
to the various items acquired, depreciation deductions would be permit-
ted only as to the player contracts (and the small items of tangible per-
sonal property that are acquired). Of course, if a stadium is acquired in
the acquisition, depreciation also would be allowed for various items of
property associated with the stadium.6
4. See Selig v. U.S., 565 F. Supp. 524 (E.D. Wis. 1983), affd, 740 F.2d 572 (7th Cir. 1984).
5. See id. at 526.
6. See discussion infra.
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A. Player Contracts
If the acquisition of a sports franchise does not include a stadium, the
only items which would be subject to the allowance for depreciation are
the player contracts and the relatively small amount of equipment and
supplies.7 In Revenue Ruling 67-379,8 the Internal Revenue Service took
the position that the cost of a player contract could not be deducted but
had to be depreciated, where the contract was a one-year baseball con-
tract with a standard renewal option (known as the reserve clause). Ac-
cording to the Revenue Ruling, the effect of the reserve clause operating
with league rules was to bind the player to the particular club for his
entire useful life as a player because the club had the right to the player's
services for as long as he was capable of playing baseball.9 The club
could not force the player to play for it, but it could deny him the right to
play for any other team.10 In light of this position, the Ruling concluded
that the player contract had a useful life extending beyond one year, and
it, therefore, had to be depreciated over its useful life."
Although the reserve clause no longer binds baseball players to their
clubs, the Revenue Ruling is the basis for the position that player con-
tracts have to be depreciated over their useful lives. Under present
league rules, where individual players are bought, the depreciation
would take place over the years the services are contracted for in the
contract.
It should be noted, however, that in baseball, for example, a player
does not become a free agent until he has played in major league base-
ball for six years. 2 Accordingly, if a team acquires a player who has not
yet played in the majors for six years, and signs him to a contract which
will expire before the six year period ends, it would appear that depreci-
7. It is noted that I.R.C. § 197, which permits amortization of goodwill and various other
intangible assets, referred to as an "amortizable section 197 intangible," over a 15-year period,
specifically excludes from a "section 197 intangible" any benefits for sports franchises and any
item acquired in connection with a sports franchise. I.R.C. § 197(e)(6). Without regard to
§ 197, an intangible can be amortized only if the intangible has an ascertainable value and an
ascertainable and defined useful life. See McCarthy v. U.S., 807 F.2d 1306 (6th Cir. 1986).
8. See Rev. Rul. 67-379, 1967-2 C.B. 127.
9. See id.
10. See id.
11. See id.
12. See BASIC AGREmEmNT BETWEEN THE AamRiCAN LEAGUE OF PROFESSIONAL BASE-
BALL CLUBS AND THE NATIONAL LEAGUE OF PROFESSIONAL BASEBALL CLUES AND MAJOR
LEAGUE BASEBALL PLAYERS AssocAToN, 1997-2000 (2001), Article XX, B. Free Agency, at
54.
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ation on the amount paid for the contract should be taken over the time
remaining in the six year period.
Because of the depreciation deductions available with respect to
players' contracts, in the past, the purchasers of sports franchises have
tried to allocate most of the purchase price to player contracts and very
little to the other assets acquired. Because the player contracts were the
only significant item of depreciable property, it is easy to understand
why they followed that procedure.
Three early cases dealt with the question of allocation when a sports
franchise is purchased.' 3 In the Laird and First Northwest Industries
cases, both of which involved expansion franchises, the Government ar-
gued its mass asset theory and took the position that depreciation could
not be allowed on player contracts because they were so intertwined
with the other assets which were acquired that no amount logically could
be allocated to the contracts. 14 Both courts ruled against the Govern-
ment on that argument, and the Government did not make the mass
asset argument in the later Selig case.' 5 The Government conceded in
that case that it is possible to make an allocation of cost among the assets
acquired.'6 The contest then centered on the proper way to make such
an allocation.' 7 Before an allocation can be made, the question of valua-
tion of the player contracts arises.' 8
In the Selig case, the court pointed out that there are three principal
markets where player contracts are traded.'9 First, the player market,
which is the most common, is where teams buy and sell contracts involv-
ing individual players and small groups of players. These transactions
usually involve individual players who are traded either for cash or for
another player or players. These transactions indicate the value of play-
ers between two existing teams negotiating with each other. The court
found that the data produced by this market is not reliable in determin-
ing value of player contracts when an existing franchise is purchased
(which includes players contracts) because, at the time of the Selig case,
13. See Laird v. U.S., 556 F.2d 1224 (5th Cir. 1977), cert denied, 434 U.S. 1014 (1978);
First Northwest Indus. of America, v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 817 (1978), rev'd on other
grounds, 649 F.2d 707 (9th Cir. 1981); see Selig v. U.S., 740 F. 2d 572 (7th Cir. 1984).
14. See Laird, 556 F.2d at 1224; First Northwest Indus. of America, 649 F.2d at 707.
15. See id.; see also Selig, 740 F.2d at 572.
16. See Selig, 740 F.2d at 579.
17. See id at 580.
18. For a discussion of the valuation of baseball players' contracts, see Steven J. Harwood,
Valuation of Player Contracts When Acquiring a Professional Baseball Team - An Analysis of
Selig v. United States, TAxns, Oct., 1983, at 670.
19. See Selig, 740 F.2d 572.
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the waiver and reserve rules which were in effect in baseball, restricted
the supply and the prices of players. The player market, therefore, was
not a "free market."
The second type of market discussed in Selig was the free agent mar-
ket. That market involves players who are first entering either the major
or minor leagues and negotiating their contracts. An experienced player
who is no longer under contract and who is a free agent would also fall
into this category, but such free agency did not exist until subsequent to
the time period involved in Selig. This market produces data which is
useful in placing a value on players in the free market, but it is not par-
ticularly useful in trying to compare values in this market with values in
the player market.
The third type of market discussed in Selig is the club market where
entire teams are bought and sold at a particular time. That was the type
of transaction involved in Selig because the Seattle Pilots were
purchased, and the transaction included the franchise itself, the player
contracts and a small amount of tangible assets. The Court found that
this market was the closest to a free market because the purchase price is
established through arm's length negotiations of the parties. This market
was held to be the relevant market for purposes of valuing the player
contracts.
The District Court relied on two of the four appraisals submitted by
the plaintiff. In addition, the plaintiff offered other evidence to support
its valuation of the player contracts-the cost of player development, the
amount of insurance covering the players and the high prices being paid
in the free agent market. There also was testimony to indicate that the
actual value of the franchise itself was small because Milwaukee was a
relatively small city where there was competition between several pro-
fessional sports franchises for the support of the public. Accordingly, the
value of the franchise was very small, and most ($10.2 million) of the
consideration paid for the Pilots ($10.8 million) was held to have been
paid for the player contracts. The District Court rejected the testimony
of the Government's expert economist as well as the two appraisals sub-
mitted by the Government. The net result was that about 94% of the
total consideration paid for the Pilots was allocated to the player con-
tracts.20 The player contracts were given a five year useful life by the
Milwaukee Brewers, and that useful life was not contested by the
Government.2'
20. See Selig, 740 F.2d at 575.
21. See U
1999]
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The Laird case, which involved the acquisition of an expansion
franchise, the Atlanta Falcons,2' and First Northwest Industries which in-
volved the acquisition of an expansion franchise, the Seattle Supersonics,
demonstrate how the amount of the purchase price available for applica-
tion to player contracts is affected by the acquisition of other intangible
rights acquired in the purchase.' In both of those cases, a portion of the
purchase price was allocated to national television rights which meant
that a smaller amount of the purchase price was available to allocate to
player contracts.24 National television rights constitute a large part of the
income of professional football and basketball teams. That is not one of
the major income sources, however, for professional baseball teams.'
B. Section 1056
On the question of allocation of the purchase price of a sports
franchise to player contracts, Congress got into the act in 1976 and en-
acted Section 1056 of the Internal Revenue Code.2 6 That section at-
tempts to place a lid on the amount that can be allocated to player
contracts acquired in connection with the franchise of a sports enter-
prise.2 7 It provides a presumption that not more than 50% of the consid-
eration is allocable to player contracts, unless it is established to the
satisfaction of the Government that an amount in excess of 50% is prop-
erly allocable to such contracts.' In addition, the section provides that
the basis of a contract acquired by the transferee will be whatever the
basis of the transferor was, increased by any gain recognized by the
transferor on the transfer of the contract.2 9 The provision relating to ba-
sis does not apply to exchanges that fall under section 1031 and to prop-
erty acquired from a decedent where basis is determined under section
1014(a) of the Code.3 °
Section 1056 refers to an allocation to player contracts where a
franchise is acquired in a sale or exchange, and in connection with that
sale or exchange, there is the transfer of a contract relating to the serv-
22. See Laird, 556 F.2d at 1224.
23. See First Northwest Indus. of America, 649 F.2d at 707.
24. See Laird, 556 F.2d at 1224; see also First Northwest Indus. of America, 649 F.2d at
707.
25. See Remarks of Bug Selig, Commissioner of Baseball, THm SPORTING NEWS, Aug. 24,
1998.
26. See I.R.C. § 1056(d).
27. See id.
28. See I.R.C. § 1056(d).
29. See I.R.C. § 1056(a).
30. See I.R.C. § 1056(b).
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ices of an athlete. Although a reading of section 1056 may make one
wonder if it only applies to a sale of an existing franchise and its players,
in a private letter ruling, the Service has expressed the view that the
section also applies in the case of expansion franchises. 31 Although pri-
vate letter rulings may not be used or cited as precedents,3' they, never-
theless, provide some insight into the thinking of the Internal Revenue
Service on a particular issue.
With respect to "any applicable asset acquisition,"33 with respect to
an acquisition of assets occurring after May 5, 1986,3 Section 1060 re-
quires that the transferee's basis in the assets, and the gain or loss of the
transferor, should be determined by allocating the consideration paid for
the assets among the assets in accord with section 338(b)(5). Section
1060 defines the term "any applicable asset acquisition" to mean any
transfer of assets which constitutes a trade or business and with respect
to which the transferee's basis is determined wholly by reference to the
consideration paid for the assets.35
The purchase of an existing sports franchise comes within the provi-
sions of Section 1060. The Regulations under section 1060 make it clear,
however, that the amount of consideration allocable to an asset under
that section
is subject to any applicable limitations under the Code or general
principles of tax law. For example, if the applicable asset acquisi-
tion is a transaction described in section 1056(a) (relating to basis
limitation for player contracts transferred in connection with the
sale of a franchise), the amount of consideration the purchaser
may allocate to a contract for the services of an athlete shall not
exceed the limitation imposed by that section.36
Accordingly, the presumption that no more than 50% of the purchase
price is allocable to player contracts should be determined first, and once
that is done, the allocation would be made in accordance with the provi-
sions of section 1060.37
In a recent case, the first litigated case to involve section 1056, the
Tax Court held that section 1056 did not apply to the purchase of a more
31. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 96-17-001 (April 26, 1996).
32. See I.R.C. § 61100)(3).
33. See I.R.C. § 1060(a), (c).
34. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1060-1T(a)(2).
35. See I.R.C. § 1060(c).
36. Treas. Reg. § 1.1060-1T(e)(2).
37. See I.R.C. § 1060. Section 1060 provides for allocation under the so-called residual
allocation method. The allocation is made in a sequential manner among five classes of assets
and is based on fair market value. See id-
1999]
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than 50% interest in a partnership which owned a sports franchise.38
That case is particularly interesting because it points out how different
amortization rules relating to player contracts can apply depending upon
whether the contracts themselves have been transferred directly to a
purchaser, along with the other assets of a sports franchise, or an interest
in the entity holding the player contracts and other assets have been
transferred.
C. Recapture of Depreciation-Section 1245
When personal property is sold on which depreciation has been
taken, the Internal Revenue Code requires that the depreciation be re-
captured and treated as ordinary income.39 A special provision, however,
is provided for player contracts.40 This provision is to the effect that
where player contracts are transferred in connection with the sale or ex-
change of a sports franchise, the recomputed basis of the player con-
tracts in the hands of the transferor is their adjusted basis, increased by
the greater of unrecaptured depreciation with respect to player contracts
acquired by the transferor when the franchise was acquired, or unrecap-
tured depreciation of the player contracts being transferred.41
The effect of this special rule is to include in the amount recaptured
and treated as ordinary income, depreciation taken on player contracts
where the player retired or died. Because the contracts of those individu-
als ordinarily would not be subject to recapture because no sale or ex-
change occurred, this special provision serves to make these amounts of
depreciation subject to recapture anyway.42
38. See P.D.B. Sports, Ltd. v. Commissioner, 109 T.C. 423 (1997). In that case, the tax-
payer was successful in arguing that under the facts, the fair market value of the player con-
tracts which were acquired when the partnership interest was acquired, could be amortized by
using their fair market value in accordance with partnership basis provisions of the Code. On
the other hand, the Government argued that Section 1056 applied to limit basis in the player
contracts to their basis in the hands of the seller, plus any gain recognized by the seller on the
sale. See id.
39. See I.R.C. § 1245(a)(1). Under this section, the amount recaptured and treated as or-
dinary income is the amount by which the lower of the recomputed basis or the sale price (or
fair market value in the case of dispositions other than sales, exchanges or involuntary conver-
sions), exceeds the adjusted basis of the property. The term "recomputed basis" refers to the
adjusted basis of the property recomputed by adding to it, the adjustments for depreciation or
amortization which have been allowed or were allowable. See § 1245(a)(2)(A).
40. See I.R.C. § 1245(a)(4).
41. See I.R.C. § 1245(a)(4)(A).
42. See id.
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D. Determining Basis of Player Contracts
In the case of the purchase of a player contract, the cost of the con-
tract which may be depreciated is the purchase price.43 In addition, any
signing bonus provided to a player also may be depreciated.' Assets are
depreciable from the date on which they are placed in service, and in the
case of signing bonuses, the placed in service date is the date on which
all parties have signed the contract.45
The MACRS and ACRS methods of determining depreciation are
not applicable to player contracts because they are intangible assets.46
The proper method for depreciating player contracts is the straight line
method, if the taxpayer is unable to justify the use of some other
method.47 The Service has referred to football players' contracts as being
intangible property under section 167(a) of the Code, for depreciation
purposes. 48
The Regulations provide that in the case of intangibles, depreciation
may be taken only on assets "to be of use in the business or in the pro-
duction of income for only a limited period. ' 49 At one time, when the
reserve clause was in effect in baseball, for example, a logical argument
could have been made that a player's contract had no definite life be-
cause the team could retain the player under the reserve clause when his
contract ended. In the present era of free agency, however, it seems less
likely that such an argument would be successful. It is still possible for
the Government to argue that a team's history and experience shows
that players' contracts are almost always renegotiated when the contract
expires, and, therefore, in reality, they have no fixed and determinable
life. But when a player is a free agent, he is free to seek employment
with another team when his contract ends, and it would seem to be diffi-
cult to contend that such a contract was renewable. One could make that
argument about any contract. In any event, it is a good idea to have in
the contract a very clear provision indicating that when the contract ter-
minates, the player is free to leave, as he pleases, and the team has abso-
lutely no power to retain him.
With respect to the possibility of depreciating non-monetary bonuses
such as performance and attendance bonuses, etc., it has been suggested
43. See I.R.C. § 1012.
44. See Rev. Rul. 67-379, 1967-2 C.B. 727.
45. See Tech. Adv. Mem. 93-0-002, 1992 WL 408935 (I.R.S.), Jan. 5, 1993.
46. See I.R.C. § 168(a).
47. See Treas. Reg. § 1.167(b)-l(a).
48. See Rev. Rul. 71-137, 1971-1 C.B. 104.
49. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-3.
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that these bonuses might possibly be the source of additional deprecia-
tion deductions." It also might be noted that if player contracts should
be acquired in a non-taxable exchange, basis of the contracts received
would be the same as the basis of the contracts transferred. 1
E. Sales of Player Contracts
Where player contracts are sold, the part of the gain over and above
the recaptured depreciation, can receive capital gains treatment. 2 Under
Section 1231 of the Code, if the gains resulting from the sale or exchange
of depreciable property used in a trade or business exceed the losses
from the sale of such property, both gains and losses are treated as long-
term capital gains and losses. 3
F. Other Dispositions of Player Contracts
It is possible to exchange a player contract for another player con-
tract and come within the non-taxable provisions of section 1031 of the
Code. As indicated previously, under section 1031, the basis of the con-
tract acquired would be the same as the basis of the contract transferred
in exchange for it.5 4 If the player contract that is acquired has a shorter
remaining life than the contract for which it is exchanged, the team ac-
quiring the contract with the shorter life will be able to depreciate its
basis over a shorter time period than would have been possible before
the exchange, which, in effect, would provide a form of accelerated de-
preciation.5 There may be some question, however, of qualifying con-
tracts of different remaining terms, as like-kind property.56
III. STADIUMS
In recent years, there has been considerable movement of profes-
sional teams-particularly in football-from one place to another.57 Lo-
cal governments are willing to offer such outstanding financial packages
50. See Philip J. Harmelink & David W. Vignes, Tax Aspects of Baseball Player Contracts
and Planning Opportunities, TAxEs, Aug. 1981, at 535.
51. See I.R.C. § 1031(d).
52. See I.R.C. § 1231.
53. See I.R.C. § 1231(a)(1).
54. See I.R.C. § 1031(d).
55. See Harmelink & Vignes, supra note 50, at 538.
56. It also has been suggested that the involuntary conversion provisions of section 1033
might be applicable where a player dies and insurance proceeds are paid pursuant to his
death. See Harmelink & Vignes, supra note 50, at 543.
57. In 1996, the Cleveland Browns moved to Baltimore and became known as the Ravens.
The old Baltimore Colts departed Baltimore in 1984 to become known as the Indianapolis
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to sports teams that the teams are interested in greatly increasing their
profits as well as the value of their franchises.s It seems that cities and
states are willing to go to almost any length to attract these professional
sports teams because having such a team has become a matter of great
local pride. Although some have contended that having a professional
team in their location serves to enhance their economies, there is no
evidence to substantiate that claim.5 9
The primary attraction to a new locaation for a sports team owner is
the deal surrounding the new stadium. The stadium is the key because it
is the source of very large revenues that do not have to be shared with
other teams in the league. In the NFL, teams do share gate receipts on a
60-40 basis with the home team getting the larger share. In the NBA, the
home team gets 100% of the gate receipts, and in MLB, National League
home teams get 90% of the gate receipts and in the American League,
home teams receive 80%.
But in the NFL, the revenue that is generated by the most expensive
seats is not shared. It is the skyboxes, the club seats and the personal seat
licenses which can provide very significant income for team owners.
Some companies are willing to pay $350,000.00 a year for a skybox at a
stadium.60 The income from these fancy seats can amount to half of the
profits that a team makes.61 The 208 "executive suites" available to the
Washington Redskins were expected to produce $15 million in 1998
which would be about one-third of the team's estimated profits for the
year.62 Even the Baltimore Ravens, a relatively new team, has suites
which produce about $12 million per year.63 Some of these suites are
rented for a ten year time period.' It is expected that the total annual
income form all luxury boxes soon will surpass $200 million. The teams
which occupy older stadiums which have none of the fancy new seating
arrangements often find themselves looking toward other cities which
Colts. In 1995, the Los Angeles Rams moved to St. Louis. In 1987, the St. Louis Cardinals'
franchise was transferred to Phoenix.
58. Antitrust Implications of Sports Franchise Relocation: Hearings on Professional Sports
Franchise Relocation - Antitrust Implications Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th
Cong. 149-154, 1996 WL 48006, Feb. 6, 1996 (testimony of Professor Andrew Zimbalist, Smith
College).
59. See Adam Safir, Note, If You Build It, They Will Come: The Politics of Financing
Sports Stadium Construction, 13 J.L. & POL. 937, 952 (1997).
60. See Sam Walker, The Best and Worst Stadium Boxes, WALL ST. J., Oct. 30, 1998, at
W1.
61. See Suite Dreams: Rating the Boxes, WALL ST. J., Oct. 30, 1998, at W6.
62. See id.
63. See id.
64. See id.
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would be agreeable to building a new stadium with all of the lucrative
seating configurations. Some look for a new stadium in their present
area. The Chicago Bears have been complaining about their stadium for
years and threatening to move either to the suburbs or out of the state.
The Detroit Lions do not earn any income from suite sales, and the
suites in the Silverdome are unattractive and almost twenty go unrented
each game.6" But the Lions believe that things will greatly improve when
they move into a new downtown stadium.
The owners contend that they need more income in order to cover
the increasing sums expended on player contracts. In recent years, par-
ticularly in football, we have seen teams move from city to city with part
of the deal involving a new stadium with plenty of skyboxes and luxury
seats.
In 1996, the Committee on The Judiciary of the United States Senate
held hearings on "Challenges Facing the Future of the [Professional
Sports] Industry. ' 66 Interesting views were expressed by congressmen
and others concerning the way to slow down the movement of teams
from one city to another. Senator Strom Thurmond of North Carolina
expressed the view that a requirement to share stadium revenue would
result in less incentive for owners to move.67 The answer which Senator
Diane Feinstein of California suggested was that an antitrust exemption
should be granted to professional football similar to the exemption of
professional baseball.68 Paul Tagliabue, Commissioner of the NFL also
took the position that an antitrust exemption with regard to franchise
relocation would help to solve the problem. One of the witnesses before
the committee, Andrew Zimbalist, a professor of economics at Smith
College, testified that the enormous sums of money generated by all of
the new stadiums ends up being divided between the players in the form
of higher salaries and profits of the owners.69 He did not believe that the
suggested antitrust exemption for football would solve the problem of
relocation and might even make it worse.7 ° In his view, the heart of the
problem is the NFL's monopoly position, and the only way of dealing
65. See id.
66. See Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing on Professional Sports: The Challenges Facing
the Future of the Industry, S. Hrg. 104-59 (1996), 1996 WL 26248 (hereinafter Industry
Hearing).
67. See id. *3.
68. See id. *9. Senator Feinstein referred to significant moves of the decade-and-a-half
prior to 1996. See id.
69. See id. *53.
70. See id. *54.
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with it is either to create more competition or regulate the problem.7
One possibility would be to break up the leagues into two or more enti-
ties. Competition for the leading cities would tend to equalize supply and
demand. He also suggested that Congress could enact legislation that
would give cities a right of first refusal, so that before a team could leave
a city, the city would be given the right to buy the team within a certain
time period.72 The city could buy the team either publicly or by naming
private investors.73
Since those hearings took place, the movement of franchises and the
building of stadiums has continued. The prices keep going up. The Wash-
ington Redskins were reported to have sold for $800 million, which in-
cludes the stadium. The Cleveland Browns recently acquired a new
franchise for $530 million. Rupert Murdoch is reported to have paid
$350 million for the Los Angeles Dodgers, a deal which included the
stadium as well as other facilities in other places.
The new stadium of the Baltimore Ravens cost $200 million and was
built with public funds.74 The deal secured by the Ravens provides that
the team gets to play in the stadium without paying any rent, and the
team is not required to pay any of the debt service. The agreement pro-
vides that the team must pay for the operating and maintenance costs of
the stadium, about $3-4 million, and is responsible for a 10% city and
state admissions tax. The Ravens' share of the sale proceeds of Personal
Seat Licenses is $68.4 million, and the team gets to keep the revenue
produced by luxury suites, premium seats, concessions and advertising
within the stadium.75 The arrangement also provides that the Ravens will
receive 50% of all revenue produced at the stadium from events other
than football games taking place there.76
Almost half of the cost of building the $223 million stadium, or $91
million, came from tax-free bonds. These bonds will be serviced over a
period of thirty years with lottery funds.77
The reason why local governments are successful in getting people to
buy their bonds is because these bonds produce tax free interest by vir-
tue of section 103 of the Internal Revenue Code. That section provides
71. See Industry Hearing, supra note 66, *54.
72. See id.
73. See id. *55.
74. See Jonathan R. Laing, Foul Play?, BARRON's, Aug. 19, 1996, at 23 & 25.
75. See id.
76. See id.
77. See Erik Brady, Some Legislators Say Baltimore Money Misspent, USA TODAY, Sep.
6, 1996, at C19.
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that "[e]xcept as provided in subsection (b), gross income does not in-
elude interest on any State or local bond. '78 A very significant exception
contained in subsection (b) provides that any private activity bond which
is not a qualified bond under section 141 of the Code, will not qualify for
the tax free interest benefit. The policy reason behind section 103 is to
provide a tax benefit for members of the public who lend funds to a state
or local government which funds are to be used for public as opposed to
private activities. Tax-exempt bonds permit the states and local govern-
ments to pay out less in the form of interest because the lower interest
rate they pay is not subject to tax in the hands of the recipients.
On the other hand, if the proceeds of bond issues are to be used for
private activities, no tax benefit is to be available. When section 103 of
the Code is applicable and the interest paid on a bond is excludable from
income, although there is a benefit to the bondholders, in effect, the rest
of the taxpayers in the country bear the burden of paying the tax liability
that is not paid by the bondholders.
Ordinarily, private activity bonds do not fall under the category of
tax-exempt bonds, unless they are "qualified" private activity bonds.79
Qualified bonds80 are private activity bonds of various types, none of
which includes stadiums or other athletic facilities."' A volume cap ap-
plies to such bonds so that there is a limit on how much can be obtained
with such bonds after which the interest on them would be subject to
income tax.
A bond will be classified as a private activity bond and, therefore, not
be tax-exempt, if, in general, the proceeds are used for private rather
than public purposes. In defining which bonds constitute private activity
bonds, the Internal Revenue Code indicates that bonds will be classified
as private activity bonds if any bond issued as part of an issue meets the
"private business use test" and the "private security or payment test," or
meets the private loan financing test. 2
A stadium which is used more than 10% of the time for athletic pur-
poses by a professional football team will satisfy the first plank of the
test. The second plank of the test is known as the "private security or
payment test." That test will be satisfied if payment of the principal or
78. See I.R.C. § 103.
79. See I.R.C. § 103(b)(1).
80. See I.R.C. § 141(e).
81. See I.R.C. § 147(e). A private activity bond cannot be a "qualified bond" if it is issued
as part of an issue and any part of the proceeds of the issue are to be used for a skybox or
other private luxury box (and for other purposes as well). See id.
82. See I.R.C. § 141(a).
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the interest on more than 10% of the proceeds of such issue is directly or
indirectly secured by any interest used or to be used for a private busi-
ness use, or the payments are secured by the payments in respect of such
property.83 The private security test also will be met if the payment on
the principal or interest on more than 10% of the bonds is to be derived
from payments in respect of property, or borrowed money, to be used
for a private business use.84
Both the private use test and either the private security or payment
test must be met if the bonds are to be private activity bonds. It would be
very difficult to avoid the private business use test in the case of a sta-
dium because, ordinarily, more than 10% of the use of the stadium will
be for private purposes. The states and local governments sidestep the
private activity bond rule by making certain that not more than 10% of
the payments of principal and interest on the securities are paid with
funds produced by activities related to the stadium. For example, when
the Cleveland Browns became the Baltimore Ravens, and the new ar-
rangement included a new stadium for use by the Ravens, the arrange-
ment was structured so that the payments of principal and interest would
be made out of a sports lottery fund."
Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan of New York introduced a bill,
S434 which, as a practical matter, would have done away with the financ-
ing of stadiums with tax-exempt bonds. The bill did permit the lesser of
5% of the proceeds of a bond issue or $5 million to avoid being treated
as private activity bonds. That bill was introduced to the Senate Finance
Committee on March 12, 1997, but never came out of the Committee.
One can only speculate as to whether it will be reintroduced, and if it is,
what its fate will be.
On the subject of stadiums and particularly skyboxes and other lux-
ury seats, it already has been noted that owners of teams are keenly
interested in the funds produced from these sources. It is interesting to
note that although these skyboxes are often leased to corporations which
use them for entertainment customers and business associates, the Inter-
nal Revenue Code limits the deductions available for lease payments
made on these accommodations. If a skybox or private luxury box is
83. See I.R.C. § 141(b).
84. See I.R.C. § 141(b)(2)(B).
85. See Dennis Zimmerman, CRS Report For Congress: Tax-Exempt Bonds and the Eco-
nomics of Professional Sports Stadiums, May 29, 1996, reprinted in CRS Reports on Tax-Ex-
empt Bonds Used to Finance Sports Stadiums, TAX NOTES TODAY (May 30, 1996); see also
Andrew Gasper, Senator Moynihan's Field of Dreams: If You Build It, They Will Come... But
Not At The Federal Taxpayers' Expense, 17 VA. L. Rv. 341 (1997).
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leased for more than one event, the deduction may not exceed "the sum
of the face value of non-luxury box seat tickets for the seats in such box
covered by the lease."86 The fact that the tax deduction available to the
companies leasing these skyboxes is severely limited, does not seem to
deter them from leasing them. Companies often pay well over
$100,000.00 per year to rent skyboxes. The fact that they are willing to
pay such sums without getting a tax deduction for most of the amount
paid underlines the fact that major sporting events have achieved such a
degree of significance and importance that companies believe that the
goodwill achieved by letting customers use these seating arrangements
far exceeds the lack of tax benefit available.
It might also be noted that the tax deduction available for any ticket
to a sports event cannot exceed the face value of such ticket.87
IV. THE PLAYERS
Looking toward the 21st century, the players will have the same tax
concerns they have always had. They will continue to feel that they pay
too much in taxes, and if salaries continue to escalate, they may become
even more tax conscious than they have been in the past.
The primary means by which players have sought to ease their tax
burden is through deferment. Those athletes who play for teams in one
of the major leagues are able to participate in the qualified pension plan
offered by their team. That is an excellent arrangement which permits
them to delay the receipt of taxable income. The qualified plan also per-
mits the income that is placed in trust for the athletes to earn income on
a tax free basis until such time as it is distributed.88
Individual athletes, who are not members of a team, are also able to
have qualified plans, which are usually referred to as either Keogh plans
or HR-10 plans. At one time, the benefits available to corporate employ-
86. See I.R.C. § 274(l)(2).
87. See I.R.C. § 274(l)(1)(B). An exception is made for tickets to a sports event organized
primarily to benefit a charitable organization. See id.
88. Qualified plans can be defined benefit plans, which are based on how much a partici-
pant in the plan will receive on retirement and require the employer to make contributions on
a regular basis to provide for the amounts which will be paid when the employee retires. The
annual benefit available to a participant on retirement, beginning in 1998, may not exceed the
lesser of $130,000.00 or 100% of the participant's average compensation for his high 3 years.
See I.R.C. § 415(b)(1); (Notice 97-58). Qualified plans can also be defined contribution plans.
This type of plan focuses on the amount that the employer can contribute to the plan. The
annual addition to such plans cannot exceed the lesser of $30,000.00 or 25% of the partici-
pant's compensation. See I.R.C. § 415(c). Cost of living adjustments can adjust upward the
figures shown for each of the above types of plans. See I.R.C. § 415(d).
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ees under their plans were superior to those available to individuals, but
beginning with years after 1983, the benefits available to individuals
were made to be substantially the same as those of corporate employees.
Accordingly, individual athletes can set up their own retirement plan
which will be similar to the plans of team players.
A team player covered by a qualified plan, may not set up his own
qualified retirement plan. If an athlete would prefer to have his own plan
rather than be part of the team's plan, he might think in terms of creat-
ing his own corporation and being an employee of that corporation. His
corporation might then "loan-out" the athlete's services to the profes-
sional team for which he will perform.89 The NBA collective bargaining
agreement does not permit teams to contract with corporations which
loan out an athlete's services to them.90 Apparently, only some baseball
teams will contract with these corporations, and such contracts have sel-
dom been entered into in the NFL.91 The NHL does permit this
arrangement.92
It does not appear that these loan-out corporations are widely used
by athletes, and there have been only three decided cases involving
them.93 It would seem that only in the NIIL should players give any
serious thought to this arrangement. Even there, the cost of incorporat-
ing and the annual expenses which operating such a corporation will re-
quire for attorneys and accountants, make these arrangements
troublesome to arrange as a practical matter. In addition, as indicated by
the Government's position in the three litigated cases referred to, the
Service does not look with favor on these corporations.
It should be noted, however, that they do have certain other advan-
tages, unrelated to qualified pension plans, for individual athletes. For
example, medical expenses paid by the corporation for its athlete-em-
ployee, would be fully deductible by the corporation and not subject to
the rule applicable to individuals which allows deductions for medical
expenses only if they exceed 7.5% of adjusted gross income.94 Group
89. Although most of the professional teams have excellent qualified retirement plans,
the plans of the National Hockey League are not as beneficial as those of the other leagues,
and for that reason, a player might think about creating his own corporation and establishing a
qualified plan for that corporation.
90. See MARIn J. GREENBERG, SPORTS LAW PRACncE § 9.26(b) (1993).
91. See id.
92. See id.
93. See Johnson v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 882, affd without opinion, 734 F.2d 20 (9th Cir.
1984), cert. denied 469 U.S. 857 (1984); Sargent v. Commissioner, 93 T.C. 572 (1989), rev'd 929
F.2d 1252 (8th Cir. 1991); Leavell v. Commissioner, 104 T.C. 140 (1995).
94. See I.R.C. § 213(a).
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term life insurance premiums, health and disability insurance premiums
and accident insurance premiums also would be deductible by the corpo-
ration. Certain expenses for meals and lodging incurred by the corpora-
tion would be deductible by the corporation and excludable from income
by the employee-athlete, if they qualify as meals and lodging furnished
on the business premises of the employer for the convenience of the em-
ployer.95 An individual could not benefit from those expenditures if he
were not incorporated.
Loan-out corporations, which, in reality, are personal service corpo-
rations, also provide the possibility of having the corporation be on a
fiscal year (with its year ending on January 31, for example) basis, while
the employee-athlete is on a calendar year basis. That can permit a delay
in reporting the income by the individual. Ordinarily, personal service
corporations must use the calendar method for computing taxable in-
come,96 but a taxpayer will not be deemed to be a personal service cor-
poration if his principal activity is the performance of services as an
athlete.97 Only the performance of services in the fields of health, law,
engineering, architecture, accounting, actuarial science, performing arts,
or consulting will be treated as the performance of personal services for
purposes of determining a taxpayers's principal activity.9"
A tax advantage could result in some situations where, for example,
the loan-out corporation uses a fiscal year ending on January 31 of the
year and the individual employee-athlete uses the calendar year basis of
reporting. The salary, and perhaps other income, received by the corpo-
ration during year one from the loan-out of the employee-athlete's serv-
ices, could all be paid at the very end of the corporation's year, in
January of year two. That would mean that the individual employee-ath-
lete would not have income until year two instead of year one. If the
employee happened to be in a lower tax bracket in year two, which prob-
ably would be unusual, that would be of benefit to him.
Another tax benefit that can result from a loan-out corporation re-
lates to the time value of money. If the athlete were to receive a salary as
a direct employee of a team, it would be subject to withholding tax as it
is paid. But if the athlete is employed by a loan-out corporation which
loans his services to the team and the team pays the loan-out corporation
under the loan-out contract, no withholding tax would be withheld until
95. See I.R.C. § 119.
96. See I.R.C. § 441(i).
97. See Treas. Reg. 1.441-4T(d), (e)(1), (2).
98. See id.
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the loan-out corporation pays the athlete, and that could be at the end of
the loan-out's year. All of the tax would be withheld at the end of the
loan-out's year rather than during the entire year. Accordingly, more
money would be available to invest during the year, and a time value of
money benefit would result to the athlete. 99
Aside from qualified plans, there are non-qualified arrangements
that are available to athletes that can be beneficial. One of the major
problems in this area is the financial security of the team that contracts
to make payments in the future to the athlete. The case of the U.S. Foot-
ball League demonstrates that teams may not be around to honor their
long-term commitments.
One of the favorite non-qualified plans that athletes have used is the
so-called Rabbi Trust.1"0 That is an irrevocable grantor trust under which
income will not be taxed to the athlete until it is actually paid. The assets
in these trusts remain subject to the claims of creditors, and the em-
ployer is taxed on the income produced by them under the grantor trust
rules. 101
Looking into the 21st century, we might expect to see some new tax
provisions designed to alleviate the burden on athletes who receive such
large incomes over a relatively small number of years and who pay taxes
at the highest rate for those years. We might see proposals that would
permit taxpayers who have contracted to earn extremely large amounts
over a relatively few years to be taxed as if they earned these large
amounts over perhaps 30 years, which would put them on a par with
corporate executives whose earning careers span a much longer period
of time. A new provision might provide for an athlete, at his option, to
either pay tax on the income when he earns it, or pay the income into a
trust fund, get a deduction for the payment and be taxable only when the
funds are withdrawn after a particular age.
The other area where activity probably will occur in the 21st century
is in the state and local taxation field. In recent years, when athletes and
their teams have traveled to away games, the states where the games are
99. See Mary LaFrance, The Separate Tax Status of Loan-out Corporations, 48 VAND. L.
Rnv. 879 (1995); Bret M. Kanis, The Utility of Personal Service Corporations for Athletes, 22
PEPP. L. Rnv. 629 (1995); Bruce M. Stiglitz & Thomas N. Lawson, Tax Planning for Entertain-
ers, Artists, and Athletes, C515 ALI-ABA 247 (1990).
100. Rabbi trusts are discussed in Bruce M. Bird & Mark A. Segal, Nonqualified (Rabbi)
Trusts Remain A Sound Choice To Defer Compensation, 16 TAX'N FOR LAW. 354 (1988).
101. For a discussion of other non-qualified plans, see Richard D. Landsberg, Entertain-
ment Retirement: A Primer On Nonqualified Deferred Compensation, 14 WTR ENT. & SPORTS
LAW. 7 (1997).
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played have taxed the athletes on income earned as a result of playing in
a game there. In recent years, cities, looking for new sources of revenue,
also have begun to tax visiting athletes participating in events in their
cities.' °2 The taxation by cities and states of visiting athletes has placed a
tremendous burden on the athletes in connection with filing returns and
keeping records. Although ordinarily, they, personally, do not prepare
all of these returns, they must pay an accountant or lawyer to handle
these matters. There is enormous complexity associated with these re-
quirements. It may be that federal legislation could be enacted to sim-
plify this problem. A federal statute might provide that states cannot tax
a nonresident on income earned in that state from personal services un-
less the individual is present there with some degree of permanence or
continuity. Playing in one or two games a year in a particular city and
state would not seem to meet that test.
V. CONCLUSION
As we enter the 21st Century, the key areas where taxation will be
most important will be in connection with franchise movement, stadium
building and players' income. There probably will be legislation affecting
the relocation of franchises which will affect the tax advantages available
to owners. It is likely that legislation will be enacted in the area of tax-
free bonds, which could affect the rush to build new stadiums with lucra-
tive skyboxes and other luxury seating arrangements. Players will seek
relief from the burden of having all of their large sums of income
bunched into a few taxable years, and a simpler system probably will be
sought with respect to the nonresident taxation of athletes by states and
cities.
102. For a discussion of the taxation of nonresident athletes, see William H. Baker, The
Tax Significance of Place of Residence For Professional Athletes, 1 MARQ. SPORTS L. J. 1
(1990); Jeffrey L. Krasney, State Income Taxation of Nonresident Professional Athletes, 2
SPORTS LAW. J. 127 (1995); Richard E. Green, The Taxing Profession of Major League Base-
ball: A Comparative Analysis of Nonresident Taxation, 5 SPORrs LAW. J. 273 (1998).
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